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PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE 11: NEW, BUT NOT NECESSARILY
IMPROVED
KIMBERLY A. STOTT
I. INTRODUCTION
L ESS than a decade after Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure was amended' to give it "teeth," 2 changes have been
I. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 was amended in 1983 to read:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall
be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, whose
address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign the
party's pleading, motion, or other paper and state the party's address. Except when
otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or
accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer under
oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sustained
by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature of an attorney or party
constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or
other paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief
formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing
law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing
law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading,
motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly
after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading,
motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or
upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented
party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the
other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the
filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
FED. R. Crv. P. 11.
The 1983 amendments replaced the original Rule 11, which was adopted in 1937:
Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one
attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who
is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading and state his address. Except
when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified
or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer under
oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sustained
by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature of an attorney constitutes
a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not inter-
posed for delay. If a pleading is not signed or is signed with intent to defeat the pur-
pose of this rule, it may be stricken as sham and false and the action may proceed as
though the pleading had not been served. For a wilful violation of this rule an attor-
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proposed to lessen the rule's sting.' Rule 11 is designed to keep law-
ney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action. Similar action may be taken
if scandalous or indecent matter is inserted.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 308 U.S. 676 (1939).
2. The "teeth" of Rule I1, as amended in 1983, "is the possible award of attorney's fees
to a party that is the victim of a violation by his opponent." Steven E. Reichert, Note, Rule I/:
A Matter of Individual Responsibility: A Case Analysis of Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Enter-
tainment Group, 110 S. Ct. 456 (1989), 13 HAMduE L. REv. 373, 388 (1990). The United States
Supreme Court has noted that the 1983 amendments deliberately expanded Rule I l's coverage.
Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., Ill S. Ct. 922, 931 (1991). The
Advisory Committee Notes following the text of Rule 11 point out that "[e]xperience shows that
in practice Rule 11 has not been effective in deterring abuses." FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory
committee's note. The Advisory Committee said it hoped the new rule would "reduce the reluc-
tance of courts to impose sanctions." Id. The Committee cautioned that the courts must limit
the scope of sanctions proceedings to ensure that those proceedings do not become "satellite
litigation." Id. Satellite litigation, if unchecked, could offset any efficiencies achieved by placing
controls on the pleadings process.
3. In 1991 the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference
of the United States proposed amendments to Rule 11 that would maintain the spirit of the 1983
amendments, but would address these problems:
(1) Rule II impacts plaintiffs to a greater extent than defendants;
(2) The fear of Rule 11 sanctions can deter parties from asserting novel legal claims;
(3) Cost-shifting, not nonmonetary sanctions, have become the norm;
(4) Rule 11 may provide a disincentive for lawyers to abandon positions after deter-
mining they cannot be supported by fact or law;
(5) The rule has created conflicts between attorneys and clients; and
(6) Dealing with Rule I I motions has become time-consuming.
Attachment to Letter from Sam C. Pointer, Jr., Chair, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, to
Robert E. Keeton, Chair, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (June 13,
1991) (on file with author).
The proposals to amend Rule 1I were the subject of much debate and discussion. See infra
text accompanying note 120.
The preliminary draft of Rule 11 amendments was issued in August 1991. It read:
RULE 11. SIGNING OF PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND OTER PAPERS; REPRESENTATIONS TO
CouRT; SANCTIONS.
(a) SIONATUE. Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be signed by
at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, or, if the party is not
represented by an attorney, shall be signed by the party. It shall state such person's
address and telephone number, if any. Except when otherwise specifically provided by
rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. An un-
signed paper shall be stricken unless omission of the signature is corrected promptly
after being called to the attention of the attorney or party.
(b) REPRESENTATIONS TO COURT. By presenting or maintaining a claim, defense, re-
quest, demand, objection, contention, or argument in a pleading, written motion, or
other paper filed with or submitted to the court, an attorney or unrepresented party is
certifying, until it is withdrawn, that to the best of the person's knowledge, informa-
tion, and belief formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances-
(1) it is not being presented or maintained for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) it is warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law; and
(3) any allegations or denials of facts have evidentiary support or, if specifically so
identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for
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yers from abusing the judicial process by imposing sanctions for filing
further investigation or discovery.
(c) SANCTIONS. Subject to the conditions stated below, the court shall impose an appropriate
sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties determined, after notice and a rea-
sonable opportunity to respond, to be responsible for a violation of subdivision (b).
(1) How INITIATED.
(A) By MOTION. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be served separately
from other motions or requests, and shall describe the specific conduct alleged to vio-
late subdivision (b). It shall not be filed with, or presented to, the court unless the
challenged claim, defense, request, demand, objection, contention, or argument is not
withdrawn or corrected within 21 days (or such other time as the court may prescribe)
after service of the motion. If warranted, the court may award to the party prevailing
on the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred in presenting or
opposing the motion.
(B) ON COURT's INITATIV. On its own initiative, the court may enter an order
describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision (b) and directing an
attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it has not violated subdivision (b) with
respect thereto.
(2) NATURE OF SANCTIONS; LnUTATIONS. A sanction imposed for violation of this
rule shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter comparable conduct by persons simi-
larly situated. Subject to the limitations in subparagraphs (A) and (B), the sanction
may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a
monetary penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion, an order directing payment to
the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorneys' fees and other costs incurred as
a direct result of the violation.
(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded, either on motion or on the court's
initiative, against a represented party unless it is determined to be responsible for a
violation of subdivision (b)(1).
(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initiative unless the
court's order to show cause is issued before a voluntary dismissal or settlement of the
claims made by or against the party to be sanctioned.
(3) ORDER. If requested, the court, when imposing sanctions, shall recite the con-
duct or circumstances determined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the
basis for the sanction imposed.
FED. R. Crv. P. 11 (Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, Aug. 15, 1991, 1-4) [hereinafter FED. R. Crv. P. 11 (proposed amendments
1991)]. The proposed rule and the Advisory Committee Notes are reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 74-82
(1991).
The 1991 amendments were modified in 1992 and sent to the U.S. Supreme Court for review.
The proposed text of Rule 11 now reads:
RULE 11. SIGNING OF PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND OTHER PAPERS; REPRESENTATIONS TO
COURT; SANCTIONS.
(a) SIONATURE. Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be signed by
at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, or, if the party is not
represented by an attorney, shall be signed by the party. Each paper shall state the
signer's address and telephone number, if any. Except when otherwise specifically
provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affida-
vit. An unsigned paper shall be stricken unless omission of the signature is corrected
promptly after being called to the attention of the attorney or party.
(b) REPRESENTATIONS TO COURT. By presenting to the court (whether by signing,
filing, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an
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unfounded, harassing, and bad-faith papers. Major revisions pro-
attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowl-
edge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circum-
stances,
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by exist-
ing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if spe-
cifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable oppor-
tunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifi-
cally so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.
(c) SANCTIONS. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court
determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject to the condi-
tions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or
parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation.
(1) How INITIATED.
(A) By MOTION. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made separately
from other motions or requests and shall describe the specific conduct alleged to vio-
late subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided in Rule 5, but shall not be filed with
or presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion (or such
other period as the court may prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, defense, conten-
tion, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected. If warranted,
the court may award to the party prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses
and attorney's fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion. Absent exceptional
circumstances, a law firm shall be held jointly responsible for violations committed by
its partners, associates, and employees.
(B) ON COURT'S INITIATIVE. On its own initiative, the court may enter an order
describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision (b) and directing an
attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it has not violated subdivision (b) with
respect thereto.
(2) NATURE OF SANCTION; LIMITATIONS. A sanction imposed for violation of this rule
shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable
conduct by others similarly situated. Subject to the limitations in subparagraphs (A)
and (B), the sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature,
an order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for
effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of some or all of the
reasonable attorneys' fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the viola-
tion.
(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented party for a viola-
tion of subdivision (b)(2).
(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initiative unless the
court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary dismissal or settlement of the
claims made by or against the party which is, or whose attorneys are, to be sanc-
tioned.
(3) ORDER. When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct deter-
mined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the sanction im-
posed.
(d) INAPPLICABILrrY TO DISCOVERY. Subdivisions (a) through (c) of this rule do not
apply to disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and motions that
are subject to the provisions of Rules 26 through 37.
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (proposed amendments 1992).
RULE 11 AMENDMENTS
posed in 1991 and 1992 would require that opposing counsel provide
written notice of and describe a Rule 11 violation before seeking sanc-
tions. 4 The proposed amendments would not change the basic philoso-
phy that litigants must "stop and think" before filing papers in
federal court.5 Instead, they are intended to make the rule "clear,
more precise and predictable.''6 Despite the drafters' good intentions,
these laudable reforms could be undermined by the imposition of a
continuing duty to ensure that a paper meets the rule's requirements. 7
The sweeping amendments to Rule 11 that were enacted in 1983
prompted an explosion of cases aimed at potential violations.' The
amendments have also generated considerable controversy.9 For exam-
ple, a nonscientific poll of attorneys conducted in 1991 found that
4. Henry J. Reske, Gentler Sanctions: Rule 11 Changes Sent to High Court, A.B.A. J.,
Dec. 1992, at 29 [hereinafter Reske, Gentler Sanctions]; Henry J. Reske, A Kinder, Gentler Rule
11, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1991, at 25 [hereinafter Reske, Kinder, Gentler]. Both the 1991 and 1992
proposals provide a "safe harbor" of 21 days that allows a litigant to withdraw a paper that is
the target of a Rule 11 violation. See infra text accompanying notes 13-16 for a discussion of the
procedure involved in adopting the amendments.
The process for revising federal rules was modified when Congress passed the Judicial Im-
provements and Access to Justice Act of 1988. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act,
Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077 (1988)).
5. Reske, Kinder, Gentler, supra note 4 (quoting committee member Arthur Miller, a Har-
vard law professor, about the 1991 proposal).
6. Id.
7. The amendments proposed in 1991 said that one who files a paper is certifying "until it
is withdrawn" that it is not being presented for an improper purpose, that it is warranted by
existing law or good-faith modification, and that allegations have or are likely to have eviden-
tiary support. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (proposed amendments 1991) at 2-3 (emphasis added). The
committee note expanded the scope of Rule I I and said that the obligations were measured as
long as the paper remained in court. This represented a change from the rule as amended in
1983. Courts have interpreted the 1983 rule as applying only when the paper is signed. See Wil-
liam W. Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11-A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181,
185 (1985); see also infra text accompanying note 32. Although the 1992 proposals remove the
language "until it is withdrawn," they nonetheless maintain the continuing duty requirement.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b) (proposed amendments 1992) at 45.
[A] litigant's obligations with respect to the contents of these papers are not measured
solely as of the time they are filed with or submitted to the court, but include reaf-
firming to the court and advocating positions contained in those pleadings and mo-
tions after learning that they cease to have any merit.
Id. advisory committee's note at 51.
8. See supra note 2 (the Advisory Committee hoped the new rule would encourage judges
to use the sanctions). Rule 11 "has spawned a cottage industry of satellite litigation" since its
1983 amendment. Randall Samborn, Rule 11 ReformsAre Criticized, NAT'L L.J., May 25, 1992,
at 3, 28; see also D. Michael Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some "Strik-
ing" Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MiNN. L. REv. 1 (1976). Rule II was
a little-used tool before it was amended in 1983. Risinger found only 19 reported Rule 11 mo-
tions, only 11 of which resulted in findings of violation. Id. at 35-36. See infra notes 81-88 and
accompanying text (discussing the increase in Rule 11 cases since the 1983 amendments).
9. See infra section IV.
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twenty-two percent of those responding thought Rule 11 should be re-
tained in its present form, twenty-five percent supported repealing
Rule 11, forty-eight percent supported amending the rule, and five
percent had no opinion.'0 While most respondents thought Rule 11
had forced attorneys to "stop and think" before signing pleadings,"
slightly more than half thought Rule lI's costs had exceeded its bene-
fits. 12 In response to considerable criticism of Rule 11, the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules, an arm of the United States Judicial Con-
ference, proposed amendments in 1991 to define specifically what
constitutes a violation and to require written notice that sanctions are
being sought. 3 The proposals were modified in the fall of 1992.14 The
new proposed version of Rule 11 must now be approved by the United
States Supreme Court and Congress. I" If approved, it will take effect
in December 1993.16
This Comment will examine Rule 11 as revised in 1983, then will
discuss the proposed amendments. The amendments retain the pri-
mary purpose of the rule-to force attorneys to stop and think 7 be-
fore filing pleadings in federal court-while protecting litigants from
being hit unexpectedly with sanctions. A strong Rule 11 is necessary
because other available resources have not curbed abuses in federal
litigation. 8 The proposed amendments adequately address many com-
plaints about Rule 11 and may streamline the process of seeking sanc-
tions. 19 However, the imposition upon lawyers of a continuing duty to
comply with Rule 11 may undermine the drafters' purpose in amend-
ing the rule.20
10. Results of Rule 11 Litigation News Fax Poll, LrrIG. NEws, June 1991, at 5. Approxi-
mately 800 attorneys responded to the poll, which was not designed to be statistically reliable,
Id.
11. Nineteen percent strongly agreed with the statement, "Rule 11 has had the effect of
making lawyers stop and think sufficiently before signing pleadings," and 53% agreed with the
statement. Id. Twenty-one percent disagreed, and only five percent disagreed strongly. Id. Two
percent had no opinion. Id.
12. Thirty-one percent strongly agreed with the statement, "The cost of Rule 11 proceed-
ings has exceeded its benefit," and another 23% agreed with that statement. Id. Thirty-one per-
cent disagreed and another 12%te strongly disagreed. Id. Three percent had no opinion. Id.
13. See supra note 3 (FED. R. Cirv. P. II (proposed amendments 1991)).
14. The Advisory Committee, whose members included judges, lawyers, and academics,
received written comments, held public hearings, and reviewed surveys about the rule. Samborn,
supra note 8, at 28.
15. See Reske, Kinder, Gentler, supra note 4, at 25; Samborn, supra note 8, at 3, 28.
16. See Reske, Kinder, Gentler, supra note 4, at 25; Samborn, supra note 8, at 3, 28.
17. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
18. See infra notes 130-38 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 119-48 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 149-56 and accompanying text.
RULE 11 AMENDMENTS
II. THE 1983 AMENDMENTS
The original Rule 11, adopted in 1938, required attorneys to sign
pleadings"1 filed in federal courts as certification that they had read
them.2 A pleading that did not meet Rule I l's requirements could be
stricken as "sham and false and the action [could] proceed as though
the pleading had not been served."" , The original rule also allowed
courts to impose sanctions, but only for willful violations that were
measured against a subjective standard.u The 1938 rule had funda-
mental flaws that made it a "paper tiger": It addressed only limited
abusive conduct, sanctions were discretionary, and the scope of sanc-
tions was limited. 2 Consequently, sanctions were seldom imposed,
and Rule 11 failed to deter misuses of the litigation process.26
Faced with abusive federal litigation that Rule 11 could not con-
trol, 27 members of the legal community agreed that a change was nec-
essary." As amended in 1983, the rule imposes a stricter standard of
conduct on lawyers during the pretrial phases of litigation by making
sanctions mandatory for failure to meet objective standards. 29 The
committee that drafted the 1983 amendments specifically sought to
21. The original Rule 11 said, "Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall
be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated.
A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading and state his address."
FED. R. Civ. P. 11, 308 U.S. 676 (1939) (emphasis added). See also Risinger, supra note 8, at 5-8
(discussing signature requirement).
22. The pre-1983 Rule 11 said the signature "constitutes a certificate by [the attorney] that
he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good
ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay." FED. R. CIr. P. 11, 308 U.S. 676
(1939) (emphasis added). See also Risinger, supra note 8, at 8.
23. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 308 U.S. 676 (1939).
24. Id. ("For a wilful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate
disciplinary action.").
25. Marsha Grim, Comment, The Horizon of Rule 11: Toward a Guided Approach to
Sanctions, 26 Hous. L. RPv. 535, 536 (1989).
26. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
27. "Experience shows that in practice Rule II has not been effective in deterring abuses."
Id. See also Melissa L. Nelken, Has the Chancellor Shot Himself in the Foot? Looking for a
Middle Ground on Rule 11 Sanctions, 41 HASTINos L.J. 383, 384 (1990) ("The 1983 amendments
were an experiment, designed to increase judicial control over litigation and to rein in some of
the perceived excesses of burgeoning lawsuits and free-form discovery.").
Rule 11 was one of several Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that were amended in 1983 to try
to deter frivolous litigation. For a more complete discussion of the other rules that were
amended, see Thomas v. Capital Security Services, 836 F.2d 866, 870 n.2 (5th Cir. 1988).
28. Grim, supra note 25, at 536.
29. "If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court.
shall impose.., an appropriate sanction .... FED. R. CIv. P. 11 (emphasis added). See also
Gregory P. Joseph, The Trouble with Rule H: Uncertain Standards and Mandatory Sanctions,
A.B.A. J., Aug. 1, 1987, at 87; Schwarzer, supra note 7, at 183 ("Amended Rule II is intended
to deter misuse or abuse of the litigation process by the imposition of sanctions.").
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give Rule 11 teeth and noted that it expected a greater range of cir-
cumstances to trigger Rule 11.03
Unlike the original Rule 11, which only applied to pleadings, the
rule as amended in 1983 applies to all papers filed in federal court.3 It
includes three basic requirements: certification, a reasonable inquiry
into the law and facts, and a legitimate purpose.
A. Certification
Under the 1983 amendments, the signature certifies that the paper
conformed to Rule 1l's requirements at the time it was filed .2 The
certification requirement gives "effect to the signature of the attorney
or party on a pleading, motion, or other paper." Under the original
Rule 11, the attorney's signature was considered a certificate that the
lawyer "had read the document, that there were good grounds to sup-
port the pleading, and that the pleading was not interposed for de-
lay." '3 4 This provision was ineffective, in part because of the subjective
standard that applied to the "good grounds" requirement. 5 As the
United States Supreme Court said in Business Guides, Inc. v. Chro-
matic Communications Enterprises, "The essence of Rule 11 is that
signing is no longer a meaningless act; it denotes merit. ' 3 6 Rule 11
sanctions can be imposed only on the attorney who signed the offend-
ing paper and not against the entire firm. 7
B. Reasonable Inquiry into the Law And Facts
Under the 1983 amendments, a lawyer cannot sue first and ask
questions later. The rule requires a reasonable prefiling inquiry into
the facts and law, and requires lawyers to base their arguments on
existing law or to indicate that they are seeking to modify, extend, or
30. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note. The Advisory Committee also said:
"The new language is intended to reduce the reluctance of courts to impose sanctions . . . by
emphasizing the responsibilities of the attorney and reenforcing those obligations by the imposi-
tion of sanctions." Id.
31. Rule 11, as amended in 1983, expressly applies to each "pleading, motion, and other
paper" filed in federal court. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
32. See Schwarzer, supra note 7, at 185.
33. Id. See also supra note 1, FED. R. Civ. P. 11; Arthur R. Miller, The New Certification
Standard Under Rule 11, 130 F.R.D. 479 (1990); Michael 0. Sutton & Gregory M. Luck, Fed-
eral Rule 11: Basic Guidelines for Avoiding Sanctions, FLA. B.J., Nov. 1987, at 31. Miller calls
the duties created when an attorney or pro se litigant signs a pleading, motion, or other paper
"perhaps the most significant and substantial change made in 1983." Miller, supra, at 479.
34. Miller, supra note 33, at 479-80.
35. Id. at 480.
36. 498 U.S. 533, 546 (1991).
37. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 126-27 (1989).
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reverse the law.38 Although the pleader's view of law ultimately may
be incorrect, the pleader must make a good-faith argument for that
view.3 9 Allegations of violations are now judged by an objective
standard 4° of "reasonableness under the circumstances" at the time
the paper was filed, 41 not by the subjective standard of the pre-1983
Rule 11. According to one judge, "There is no room for a pure heart,
empty head defense under Rule 11.'' 42
C. Legitimate Purpose
The requirement of a "legitimate purpose" is designed to keep at-
torneys from filing papers for an improper purpose, such as repeat-
edly filing the same claim despite adverse rulings,43 or filing papers to
harass another party, to create a delay, or to needlessly increase the
cost of litigation.4 In Dreis & Krump Manufacturing v. International
Ass'n of Machinists,45 the court upheld Rule 11 sanctions against an
attorney who apparently did not realize that based on existing law his
suit did not have merit.4 Allegations of violations are weighed under
an objective standard. The signer's prefiling inquiry is "tested against
38. Sutton & Luck, supra note 33, at 32; supra note 1, 1983 amendments to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure I1.
Some have suggested that requiring papers to be grounded in law and fact threatens to under-
mine the federal courts' otherwise liberal pleading standards. See Note, Plausible Pleadings: De-
veloping Standards for Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 HARv. L. REv. 630, 633, 637 (1987) ("Liberal
pleading favors decisions on the merits only after the particular circumstances of a claim have
been revealed. Some interpretations of rule II place a higher value on ensuring that courts not
spend time adjudicating claims that might turn out to have insufficient factual bases.").
39. Zaldivar v. City of L.A., 780 F.2d 823, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1986), abrogated by Cooter &
Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990).
40. Miller, supra note 33, at 482.
41. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
42. Schwarzer, supra note 7, at 187. (Schwarzer was a United States District Judge in the
Northern District of California, and is an authority on Rule 11. In 1990 Schwarzer took a five-
year assignment as director of the Federal Judicial Center in Washington, D.C. Tribute and
Farewell to Judge William W. Schwarzer, 747 F. Supp. lxvii (1990)). See also Oliveri v. Thomp-
son, 803 F.2d 1265, 1275 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub nom. Suffolk County v. Graseck, 480
U.S. 918 (1987) ("there is no necessary subjective component to a proper rule 11 analysis");
Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of N.Y., 762 F.2d 243, 253 (2d Cir. 1985) (an attorney's subjec-
tive good faith will not serve as a "safe harbor" against the imposition of sanctions).
43. Sutton & Luck, supra note 33, at 33; FED. R. Cirv. P. 11.
44. Rule 11, as amended in 1983, says the signature certifies that the paper "is not inter-
posed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation." FED. R. Civ. P. 11. See also Szabo Food Serv. v. Canteen
Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1080 (7th Cir. 1987) (discussing Rule 11 requirements); Robin J. Collins,
Note, Applying Rule 11 to Rid Courts of Frivolous Litigation Without Chilling the Bar's Crea-
tivity, 76 Ky. L.J. 891,901 (1987-88) (describing what triggers Rule 11).
45. 802 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1986).
46. Id. at 255.
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a standard of reasonableness under the circumstances, ' 47 not against
the subjective standard of good faith that was allowed under the old
rule.
III. SANCTIONS UNDER THE 1983 AMENDMENTS
Before Rule 11 was amended, courts had to find subjective bad
faith before imposing sanctions.48 Even then, sanctions were discre-
tionary.49 The rule did not expressly authorize monetary sanctions
even when a lawyer acted in bad faith, but provided that the pleading
should be stricken. 0 Amended Rule 11 now permits striking a plead-
ing only if it is not signed.5
The Advisory Committee anticipated that sanctions would be im-
posed more often under the amended rule.12 The 1983 amendments
made sanctions mandatory for violations such as groundless or abu-
sive filings." Since Rule 11 was amended, sanctions have been im-
posed for misstating the law, for bringing suits for revenge, and for
failing to allege facts necessary to state a particular cause of action.54
Sanctions have also been imposed "when the party's position is
47. Miller, supra note 33, at 483. Miller also notes that all thirteen circuits have adopted the
objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 484.
48. See, e.g., Zaldivar v. City of L.A., 780 F.2d 823, 829 (9th Cir. 1986), abrogated by
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990) (discussing Rule 11 before the 1983
amendments). The pre-1983 rule had a subjective focus: "The signature of an attorney consti-
tutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, infor-
mation, and belief, there is good ground to support it." Id. at 829 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 11,
308 U.S. 676 (1939)) (emphasis added).
49. See Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 191 (1988). The
pre-1983 Rule II also said, "For a wilful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to
appropriate disciplinary action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 308 U.S. 676 (1939).
50. The rule simply said that "an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary
action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 308 U.S. 676 (1939). See also Adam H. Bloomenstein, Developing
Standards for the Imposition of Sanctions Under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 21 AKRON L. REV. 289, 293 (1988) ("Even if a court found that an attorney acted in bad
faith, the rule lacked an express authorization for the imposition of monetary sanctions.").
51. "If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is
signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant." FED. R.
CIv. P. 11.
52. "The new language is intended to reduce the reluctance of courts to impose sanctions
.by emphasizing the responsibilities of the attorney and reenforcing those obligations by the
imposition of sanctions." Id. advisory committee's note.
53. "If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court,
upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a repre-
sented party, or both, an appropriate sanction." FED. R. Cnr. P. 11 (emphasis added.) See also
Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168, 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("A refusal to invoke Rule 11
constitutes error.").
54. See cases cited in Kim M. Rubin, Note, Has a "Kafkaesque Dream" Come True? Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 11: Time for Another Amendment?, 67 B.U. L. REv. 1019, 1023-24
(1987).
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groundless under existing law, there is a failure to cite controlling law,
or there is a misstatement as to the content of existing law."" Courts
have specifically rejected the subjective standard that applied under
the pre-1983 rule. In Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, for example, the
court held that Rule 11 sanctions were appropriate if a paper is frivo-
lous, legally unreasonable, or without factual foundation, even if it
was not filed in subjective bad faith.16
The goal of sanctions is to deter both the violator 7 and others."'
Although the rule authorizes monetary sanctions, courts have held
that sanctions should be "educational and rehabilitative ... and...
tailored to the particular wrong." 59 In Thomas v. Capital Security
Services, the court held that sanctions "should be the least severe...
adequate to the purpose of Rule 11." 6 Despite the availability of
sanctions such as admonishments or reprimands, sanctions still tend
to be monetary.6 1 Although judges can impose sanctions on their own,
the imposition of sanctions is typically triggered by an attorney's mo-
tion requesting sanctions. 62
Despite the mandatory nature of Rule 11, violations do not always
draw sanctions. Some courts have declined to impose sanctions for
novel legal theories that have some merit. 63 In Oliveri v. Thompson,
55. Miller, supra note 33, at 489.
56. 780 F.2d 823, 831 (9th Cir. 1986), abrogated by Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496
U.S. 384 (1990).
57. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 390 (1990).
58. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Exam-
ple of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1925, 1934 (1989).
One commentator argues that Rule II has led to over-deterrence because judges rule incor-
rectly on requests for sanctions and lawyers invoke Rule 11 against nonfrivolous positions. Mark
S. Stein, Rule 11 in the Real World: How the Dynamics of Litigation Defeat the Purpose of
Imposing Attorney Fee Sanctions for the Assertion of Frivolous Legal Arguments, 132 F.R.D.
309, 328-29 (1991).
59. Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., 836 F.2d 866, 877 (5th Cir. 1988).
60. Id. at 878. "What is 'appropriate' may be a warm friendly discussion on the record, a
hard-nosed reprimand in open court, compulsory legal education, monetary sanctions, or other
measures appropriate to the circumstances." Id.
61. See Nelken, supra note 27.
62. Rule II says that sanctions may be imposed by the court "upon motion or upon its own
initiative." FED. R. Civ. P. 11). In addition, the advisory committee notes say,
Courts currently appear to believe they may impose sanctions on their own mo-
tion .... Authority to do so has been made explicit in order to overcome the tradi-
tional reluctance of courts to intervene unless requested by one of the parties. The
deduction and punishment of a violation of the signing requirement, encouraged by
the amended rule, is part of the court's responsibility for securing the system's effec-
tive operation.
Id. advisory committee's note; see also Vairo, supra note 49, at 220.
63. See, e.g., Card v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 126 F.R.D. 654, 656 (D. Miss. 1989)
("Plaintiffs' positions are not required to be legally correct.")
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for example, the court held that courts should resolve doubts in favor
of the signer and should not use hindsight to determine whether a vio-
lation occurred. 4 However, there is a fine line between good advocacy
and pursuing a groundless claim, 65 and this has contributed to some of
the inconsistency in interpreting Rule 11.
The United States Supreme Court recently held in Business Guides,
Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises that Rule 1 1 sanctions
should not be tied to the outcome of the litigation." Instead, the focus
should be on whether a filing was well-founded.67 Other courts have
offered guidance to trial judges who must often draw these fine lines.
For example, in Brown v. Federation of State Medical Boards, the
court set forth factors that should be considered in determining
whether a party made a reasonable inquiry into the facts and law of a
case. 68 For factual inquiries, the court should consider the complexity
of the case, whether discovery would have helped the factual develop-
ment, and the time available for investigation. 69 The focus of legal
inquiries should include the complexity of the legal questions, whether
the party made a good faith effort to extend or to modify the law, and
the time available for research.70 However, appellate courts apply a
deferential standard when reviewing a district court's imposition of
sanctions and other findings. 7'
IV. CRrrIcIsMs OF THE 1983 AMENDMENTS
In attempting to curtail federal litigation, the drafters of the 1983
amendments created other problems. Most fundamentally, Rule lI's
"reasonable factual inquiry" imposes strict requirements that seem to
conflict with the federal rules' liberal pleading scheme.72 The rule has
64. 803 F.2d 1265, 1275 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub noma. Suffolk County v. Graseck,
480 U.S. 918 (1987). The Second Circuit also held in Eastway Construction Corp. v. City of New
York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985). that courts should find a Rule II violation only when it
is "patently clear that a claim has absolutely no chance of success .... "
65. Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (while a party should
not be penalized for an aggressive litigation posture, attorneys should not assert claims or de-
fenses "grounded on nothing but tactical or strategic expediency.").
66. 498 U.S. 533, 553 (1991).
67. Id.; see also Nelken, supra note 27, at 388 (discussing whether the benefits of imple-
menting Rule 11 are outweighed by the increased burden of the courts).
68. 830 F.2d 1429 (7th Cir. 1987), abrogated by Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank, 880
F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1989).
69. Id. at 1435.
70. Id.
71. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 400 (1990).
72. Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 8 ("A pleading . . . shall contain ... a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief .... ") For a brief discussion of Rule
II and its interplay with the federal rules' liberal pleading scheme, see Grim, supra note 25, at
547, and Note, supra note 38, at 641-42.
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also been criticized because it (1) has been inconsistently interpreted
and applied;"7 (2) has generated expensive satellite litigation; 74 (3) has
had a "chilling" effect on civil rights plaintiffs and lawyers; 7" (4) con-
tains inappropriate sanctions to cure incompetence; 76 and (5) has been
administered so that monetary sanctions are used as fee-shifting. 77
One law professor notes that Rule 1 1 has been interpreted so incon-
sistently that "there is a conflict between or among circuits on practi-
cally every important question of interpretation and policy" under the
rule. 78 Because of these inconsistencies, practicing under Rule 11 has
been likened to "negotiating a minefield. 7 v9 For example, the rule of-
fers no assistance in determining when a position constitutes an argu-
ment for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law,
which the rule permits, or is simply rehashing an argument that is un-
warranted by existing law, which the rule forbids. 0
Once rare, motions under Rule 11 are now routine."' In trying to
control federal litigation, the drafters created an increase in "satel-
lite" litigation.8 2 This is demonstrated by the number of Rule 11 cases
reported. Where there were only a few Rule II cases reported before
1983,11 there were 688 decisions reported between August 1, 1983, and
December 15, 1987.8 This increase has led one commentator to sug-
gest that Rule 11 has become an "overused 'new toy."'8'5 Other com-
mentators are critical because "the rule itself has become a means of
73. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
75. Carl Tobias, Uneven Use Mars Rule 11, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 5, 1991, at 13.
76. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
77. See infra notes 92-104 and accompanying text.
78. See Burbank, supra note 58, at 1930-31, and cases cited therein. Burbank says conflicts
have arisen about (1) the duties imposed on the person who signs a paper filed in district court;
(2) procedural rights of those sanctioned; (3) on whom sanctions may be imposed; (4) the stan-
dard of appellate review; and (5) whether sanctions are mandatory. Id. Conflicts also exist
within circuits. Id. at 1931.
79. See Joseph, supra note 29, at 87, 89. Joseph also raised a criticism that seems at odds
with the purpose of Rule 11. He says attorney-client problems might develop because, under
Rule 11, an attorney must refuse to bring a spurious, bogus, or meritless claim for a client. Id. at
90.
In addition, a Federal Judicial Center survey conducted in 1985 found substantial inconsisten-
cies among judges' interpretations of Rule 11. See Note, supra note 38, at 641 (citing S. Kassin,
An Empirical Study of Rule 11 Sanctions 38 (Federal Judicial Center 1985)).
80. See Joseph, supra note 29, at 88.
81. See Vairo, supra note 49, at 195.
82. See, e.g., Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., 836 F.2d 866, 871 n.4 (5th Cir. 1988). Satellite
litigation is a suit within a suit that does not deal with the merits of the case.
83. See Risinger, supra note 8.
84. See Vairo, supra note 49, at 199.
85. See Rubin, supra note 54, at 1024.
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harassment and delay." 8 6 Satellite litigation wastes court time, partic-
ularly when viewed in light of statistics indicating that sanctions are
granted infrequently. 7 In fact, in Golden Eagle Distributing Corp. v.
Burroughs Corp., the court suggested that satellite litigation might ac-
tually be more trouble than the frivolous suits Rule 1 1 is supposed to
keep out of federal courts.8
The reported cases suggest that Rule 11 is being used disproportion-
ately against plaintiffs, particularly in civil rights cases,89 employment
discrimination cases, securities fraud cases brought by investors, and
antitrust cases brought by small companies. 9° The advisory committee
notes to Rule 1 1 indicate that courts should not use hindsight to deter-
mine whether sanctions are appropriate, but should evaluate conduct
in light of what was reasonable at the time the paper was signed. 91
Despite this guidance, the rule has been criticized because of the possi-
bility that the fear of Rule 11 sanctions has "chilled" some plaintiffs
from bringing certain cases. 92
In addition, some critics have suggested that Rule 11 does nothing
to ensure competence because punishment will not cure a lawyer of
incompetence: "Neither the cane nor the dunce cap has proved to be
an effective educational tool. While Rule 11 sanctions may have an
impact on a lawyer's attitude or behavior, they will not pour wisdom
into an 'empty head."'' 93 Instead, critics say, Rule 1 1 simply gives the
"hardball" litigator another tool. 94
Rule 1 1 has also been criticized for its use as a vehicle to recover
attorney's fees. 95 Under the "American Rule," each side in litigation
86. See Collins, supra note 44, at 893.
87. See Stein, supra note 58, at 330 (One study indicates that Rule 11 sanctions are awarded
in only 13.6% of the cases in which motions are filed.).
88. 801 F.2d 1531, 1537 (9th Cir. 1986).
89. See Christopher A. Considine, Note, Rule 11: Conflicting Appellate Standards of Re-
view and a Proposed Uniform Approach, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 727, 739 (1990).
90. See Vairo, supra note 49, at 200.
91. "The court is expected to avoid using the wisdom of hindsight and should test the sig-
ner's conduct by inquiring what was reasonable to believe at the time the pleading, motion, or
other paper was submitted." FED. R. Crv. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
92. See Vairo, supra note 49, at 200. The drafters of the 1983 amendments recognized this
potential and said, "The rule is not intended to chill an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity in
pursuing factual or legal theories." FED. R. Crv. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
93. Alex Elson & Edwin A. Rothschild, Rule 11: Objectivity and Competence, 123 F.R.D.
361, 365 (1989); see also Vairo, supra note 49, at 233. ("An unthinking or barely competent
attorney ... should not be punished with fee-shifting.").
94. See Elson & Rothschild, supra note 93, at 366.
95. Indeed, one court has held that "Rule II is a fee-shifting statute . Hays v. Sony
Corp., 847 F.2d 412, 419 (7th Cit. 1988), abrogated by Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496
U.S. 384 (1990). However, the purpose of Rule 11 was not fee-shifting. See Burbank, supra note
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must bear his or her own costs." Rule 11 is one of several rules that
provide exceptions to the American Rule in an attempt to deter
groundless litigation." The Rule limits recovery of attorney's fees to
an amount that is both "reasonable" and caused by the violation.98
One commentator says fee-shifting is "probably the most effective
sanction" because it compensates innocent parties for the cost of de-
fending a frivolous lawsuit and holds the violator accountable for
damages. 99 However, critics argue that imposing attorney's fees does
not promote the purpose of Rule ll-to make attorneys "stop and
think" before filing pleadings.100 Indeed, the courts' failure to use
sanctions other than the imposition of fees is responsible for much of
the satellite litigation that stems from Rule 11.101
Courts have tried to tie attorney's fees to the harm done. In In re
Yagman, the court said sanctions of attorney's fees should be based
on the "reasonableness of the claimed fees," and should not exceed
the fees necessary to defend an action. 02 Despite the Yagman court's
approach and other courts' calls to impose only the most appropriate
sanction to deter the violator, 03 courts routinely impose attorney's
fees-not alternative penalties-as sanctions.0 4
58, at 1947.
See also Nelken, supra note 27, at 389. Nelken argues that the potential for recovering attor-
ney's fees "has, in effect, created a cause of action for fees, and failing to include a prayer for
sanctions in many pleadings would be malpractice . . . when the client has a colorable argument
for them." 1d. Nelken also has found that attorney's fees have been imposed as sanctions in
96% of the cases finding a Rule 11 violation. Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended
Federal Rule ll-Some "Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Pun-
ishment, 74 GEo. L.J. 1313 (1986).
See also Vairo, supra note 49, at 201-02 (arguing that as Rule 11 becomes seen as a fee-shifting
device, the likelihood of motions for sanctions increases). "Indeed, the Kafka-esque nightmare
of cross-motions for Rule 11 sanctions appears almost uniformly in such litigation." Id. at 202.
96. By comparison, the "English Rule" requires the losing party to pay the prevailing par-
ty's costs. See Rubin, supra note 54, at 1024 n.32.
97. Id. at 1024; see also infra notes 132-38 and accompanying text. In addition, Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 16 and 26 allow sanctions for abuse of discovery and other pretrial
matters.
98. "If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court...
shall impose . . . the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the
pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee." FED. R. Crv. P. 11.
99. Neal H. Klausner, Note, The Dynamics of Rule I]: Preventing Frivolous Litigation by
Demanding Professional Responsibility, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 300, 331 (1986).
100. See Vairo, supra note 49, at 231.
101. Id. (Much Rule 11 litigation would cease "because the 'prevailing' party will no longer
be lured by the prospect of recovering its fees.").
102. 796 F.2d 1165, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 963 (1987).
103. See, e.g., Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., 836 F.2d 866, 878 (5th Cir. 1988) ("[T]he
district court should utilize the sanction that furthers the purposes of Rule 11 and is the least
severe sanction adequate to such purpose.").
104. See supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
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The United States Supreme Court has recently been criticized for
broadening the reach of Rule 11. In 1991, in Business Guides, Inc. v.
Chromatic Communications Enterprises, the Court broadened the
reach of Rule 11 when it decided that the certification standard is the
same for a party as it is for an attorney, regardless of whether the
party was required to sign a paper. 105 Relying on the plain meaning of
Rule 11, the Court upheld sanctions against a company whose em-
ployee signed a sworn application for a temporary restraining order. 06
The Court held that any party who signs a court document will be
held to Rule lI's requirements even if he or she was not required to
sign the document.' 7 One critic has suggested that the Business
Guides case is an example of the "very type of aggressive and un-
founded litigation tactics that the revised Rule was aimed at end-ing.,,108
The dissent in Business Guides'09 criticized the majority for penaliz-
ing well-intentioned litigants "if they do not satisfy some objective
standard of care in the preparation or litigation of a case." ' 0 The dis-
senters, acknowledging the strains on the court system, nonetheless
wrote:
Our annoyance at spurious and frivolous claims, and our real
concern with burdened dockets, must not drive us to adopt
interpretations of the rules that make honest claimants fear to
petition the courts. We may be justified in imposing penalties on
attorneys for negligence or mistakes in good faith; but it is quite a
different matter, and the exercise of a much greater and more
questionable authority, for us to impose that primary liability on
citizens in general." '
In Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., the Court again broadened
the reach of Rule 11 by holding that a district court may sanction a
plaintiff even when the plaintiff has dismissed the complaint under
105. 498 U.S 533, 543-48 (1991).
106. Id. at 545.
107. Id. at 554. Justice O'Connor wrote for the majority: "[A] represented party who signs
his or her name bears a personal, nondelegable responsibility to certify the truth and reasonable-
ness of the document." Id.
108. Lmo. NEws, June 1991, at 5 (quoting Loren Kieve, co-chair of the Federal Procedure
Committee). Kieve also said, "[Tihe costs of Rule 11 proceedings, both financial and profes-
sional, have exceeded its benefit." Id.
109. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., 498 U.S. 533, 554 (1991)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (joined by Marshall and Stevens, JJ., and in part by Scalia, J.).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 570 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(i)." 2 Rule 41(a)(1) allows a
plaintiff to dismiss an action voluntarily by filing a notice of dismissal
before service by the opposing party of an answer or of a motion for
summary judgment."3 The Court held that the act of filing a baseless
or improper complaint, even if it is eventually withdrawn, can be the
basis of a Rule 11 sanction." 4
In his dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the majority would evis-
cerate Rule 41(a)(1) by focusing on the filing of baseless complaints
and not on whether they actually waste judicial resources." 5 "The fil-
ing of a frivolous complaint which is voluntarily withdrawn imposes a
burden on the court only if the notation of an additional civil pro-
ceeding on the court's docket sheet can be said to constitute a bur-
den,"" 6 Stevens wrote. He argued that Rule 11 was designed to deter
parties from abusing judicial resources, not from filing frivolous com-
plaints."17
Another recent Rule 11 case from the United States Supreme Court,
Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, narrowed the
rule's impact somewhat by allowing sanctions only against the attor-
ney who signed the document and not against an entire firm.l"'
112. 496 U.S. 384 (1990). The Court affirmed a lower court ruling that Cooter & Gell had
conducted a grossly inadequate prefiling investigation. Id. at 397-98. Cooter & Gell filed a law-
suit for Danik, Inc., alleging that Hartmarx and two subsidiaries engaged in a nationwide con-
spiracy to fix prices and to eliminate competition through a retail agent policy and a uniform
pricing scheme. Id. at 388-89. The prefiling investigation consisted of telephone calls to retailers
in four cities. Danik, Inc. v. Hartmarx Corp., 120 F.R.D. 439, 441 (D.D.C. 1988), aff'd, 875
F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1989), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx
Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990).
113. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(l)(i).
114. Cooter& Gell, 496 U.S. at 395. See also Craig K. Van Ess, Comment, Cooter & Gell v.
Hartmarx Corp., Caveat Advocatus, The Growing Impact of Rule 11 Sanctions, 25 VAL. U. L.
REv. 311, 323 (1991). An attorney has a duty not to waste judicial resources. Id. at 325. Before
Cooter & Gell reached the United States Supreme Court, an appellate court in Szabo Food Serv-
ice v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 1987), held that a Rule 11 violation occurs
when a paper is filed, regardless of the ultimate outcome of the case. Even a complaint that is
ultimately dismissed under Rule 41(a)(1)(i) takes up the court's time. Id.
115. Copter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 409 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 411 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
117. Id.
118. 493 U.S. 120, 126 (1989). The Court said Rule 11 was supposed to "bring home to the
individual signer his personal, nondelegable responsibility." Id. The lower court had held that
Rule 11 sanctions "should generally be imposed on a signer's law firm as well as on the individ-
ual signing an offending paper." Calloway v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 854 F.2d 1452, 1479
(2d Cir. 1988), rev'd in part sub nom. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493
U.S. 120 (1989). The court gave numerous reasons for imposing sanctions on the entire firm,
including that a law firm may also endorse the offending document, an individual attorney usu-
ally signs a document on the firm's behalf, partners in a law firm share revenues and costs
generated from the firm's cases, and a paper that results in a sanction may be the product of
several lawyers. Id.
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V. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
With the many criticisms of Rule 11 in mind, Congress created the
Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules of the Federal Judicial Con-
ference in August 1990 to study the rule. 1 9 The Committee solicited
input, much of which criticized the rule, and issued its proposed
amendments in 1991.120 These proposals, and the 1992 proposals ulti-
mately sent to the United States Supreme Court, are designed to re-
duce the frequency of Rule 11 motions and to equalize the burden on
plaintiffs and defendants.' 2'
The proposed amendments:
- Require opposing counsel to supply specific, written notice to a
party about a possible Rule 11 violation along with the reasons
on which it is based before moving for sanctions. The 1992
proposals give a party twenty-one days to withdraw or correct
a paper that is alleged to violate Rule 11. 122
- Allow factual assertions that parties believe will be supported
by evidence "after a reasonable opportunity for further investi-
gation or discovery."' 2
- Emphasize that sanctions may be either monetary or non-mon-
etary.1' 4 This includes restricting the sanctions "to what is suf-
ficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable
conduct by others similarly situated."' 25
- Impose a continuing duty to ensure that papers are not filed to
harass another party, and are warranted by existing law or a
nonfrivolous argument for modification or reversal of existing
law. 126
119. See Tobias, supra note 75, at 13.
120. FED. R. Csv. P. I I (proposed amendments 1991).
121. See Reske, Kinder, Gentler, supra note 4, at 25 (quoting Judge Sam C. Pointer, Jr.,
Chair of the Advisory Committee); FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (proposed amendments 1992) at 49; FED.
R. Civ. P. II (proposed amendments 1991) at 4 ("This revision is intended to remedy problems
that have arisen in the interpretation and application of the 1983 revision of the rule."). The
committee also said:
The rule retains the principle that attorneys and pro se litigants have an obligation to
the court to refrain from conduct that frustrates the aims of Rule 1. The revision
broadens the scope of this obligation, but places greater constraints on the imposition
of sanctions and should reduce the number of motions for sanctions presented to the
court.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (proposed amendments 1992) advisory committee's note at 50.
122. Id. at 47 (proposed amendments 1992).
123. Id. at 46.
124. Id. at 48-49.
125. Id. at 48.
126. Id. at 45-46.
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A. The Need for Amendments
Rule 11 was amended in 1983 as an experiment 2" to curtail abusive
litigation by punishing violators. From that perspective, the increase
in the amount of Rule 11 litigation tends to indicate that the experi-
ment has been at least a partial success.12 The rule as amended in
1983 requires some fine-tuning, however, to keep the focus on deter-
ring violators and requiring lawyers to "stop and think" before they
file pleadings. Rule 11 is not a cure-all for abusive litigation practices.
It is, however, a necessary tool to encourage lawyers to devote close
attention to litigation at the prefiling stages. 129
Given the other resources available to courts to curb abusive litiga-
tion, courts might not seem to need Rule 11. The American Bar Asso-
ciation's (ABA) model rules3 0 impose a duty on an attorney to avoid
frivolous claims or defenses and to avoid malicious or harassing be-
havior.' These are precisely the abuses that Rule 11 targets. How-
ever, these ABA rules and standards are only guidelines, and do not
carry the force of Rule 11.
Courts also have an inherent equitable power to award expenses,
including attorneys' fees, to a litigant whose opponent brings a law-
127. See Burbank, supra note 58, at 1927.
128. See e.g., Nelken, supra note 27 (there were more than 700 Rule 11 decisions in the first
four years after the 1983 amendments to Rule 11.). There were only a handful of cases before
Rule 11 was amended in 1983. See Risinger, supra note 8, at 5.
129. See Van Ess, supra note 114, at 330. This will ensure both fewer frivolous lawsuits and
more competent representation.
130. The American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct were adopted in
August 1983. See THOMAS D. MoRoN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 1991 SELECTED STANDARDS ON
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLITY 1 (1991). These rules are intended to replace the ABA's Model
Code of Professional Responsibility, which was adopted in 1970. See id. at 123; Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1251 (1991).
131. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct say, "A lawyer shall not bring or defend a
proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not
frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of
existing law." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1990).
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility says:
(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:
(1) File a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take other action
on behalf of his client when he knows or when it is obvious that such action would
serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another.
(2) Knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law,
except that he may advance such claim or defense if it can be supported by good faith
argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.
MODEL CODE Os PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsimrrY DR 7-102(A)(l)-(2) (1981). Almost every state
adopted the Code and federal courts recognize it to exercise powers over lawyers. See Hazard,
supra note 130, at 1251.
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suit in bad faith, or for oppressive reasons.' 32 In addition, 28 U.S.C. §
1927 gives courts the authority to impose costs against lawyers who
have "unreasonably and vexatiously" increased the costs of litigation
by protracting proceedings.'33 Courts have been reluctant to rely on
these provisions, however, primarily because they require a finding of
bad faith. 134
Sanctions that require a subjective finding of bad faith, therefore,
are not the key to curbing abusive behavior. The "hammer" that
forces attorneys to file meritorious, well-researched claims in federal
court lies with the objective requirement found in Rule 11. The rule,
with its 1983 amendments, focuses on investigative efforts, not the at-
torney's subjective state of mind. It has proven to be the vehicle for
prodding lawyers into meeting that standard because it "gives legal
force to the ethical directive that a lawyer's duty to his client cannot
be permitted to override his duty to the justice system."' 35 Overall, the
proposed amendments keep the spirit of the 1983 amendments, but
make modifications that could make the rule more palatable'36 by nar-
rowing its scope. 3 7 Unfortunately, the amendments aimed at fairness
132. See, e.g., Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766-67 (1980), superseded by
Morris v. Adams-Miller Corp., 758 F.2d 1352 (10th Cir. 1985); G.J.B. & Assocs. v. Singleton,
913 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1990).
133. An attorney who "multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously
may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees
reasonably incurred because of such conduct." 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988).
134. "Judges, sharing professional and social ties with attorneys and expecting vigorous ad-
vocacy, understandably have been reluctant to accuse lawyers of subjective bad faith. Not sur-
prisingly, the threat of sanctions under the bad faith exception has been an ineffective deterrent
of frivolous litigation." Klausner, supra note 99, at 311. Courts also have been reluctant to
impose sanctions under § 1927: "Sanctions were rarely imposed . . . because of a restrictive
judicial interpretation, generally requiring a showing of subjective bad faith." Id. at 312. See
also Vairo, supra note 49, at 192. Among the cases Vairo cites, id. at 192 n.10, is Roadway
Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766 (1980), where the court said a finding of bad faith must
precede sanctions under the court's inherent powers.
135. Klausner, supra note 99, at 316. In addition, the advisory committee notes to the 1992
proposals indicate that " [r]ule 11 is not the exclusive source for control of improper presenta-
tions of claims, defenses, or contentions." FED. R. Crv. P. 11 (proposed amendments 1992)
advisory committee's note at 58. However, the committee pointed out that the Court in Cham-
bers v. NASCO, Ill S. Ct. 2123 (1992), cautioned that courts should rely on Rule I l-and not
their inherent powers-if appropriate sanctions could be imposed trider Rule 11. Id.
136. The committee notes say, "This revision is intended to remedy problems that have
arisen in the interpretation and application of the 1983 revision of the rule." FED. R. Crv. P. II
(proposed amendments 1992) advisory committee's note at 49.
137. The proposals eliminate the strict requirement that all papers must be based on infor-
mation and belief available at the time the paper was filed. FED. R. Crv. P. 11 (proposed amend-
ments 1992). Instead, the amendments would allow litigants to file papers that "are likely to
have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery."
FED. R. Civ. P. 1 I (proposed amendments 1992) at 46 (emphasis added).
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and fair warning may be undercut by a proposal that would impose a
continuing duty on litigants.,"
B. Some Proposed Improvements
The 1992 proposals offer one chief improvement: They would allow
a party to bring a claim that is likely to have evidentiary support only
after further investigation or discovery.'39 This offers some leeway for
fact development. The committee notes stress that this proposal "does
not relieve litigants from the obligation to conduct an appropriate in-
vestigation into the facts . . . [and] is not a license to join parties,
make claims, or present defenses without any factual basis or justifi-
cation."' 14 However, this proposal could help thaw the "chill" some
plaintiffs have felt. It also will put plaintiffs on a more equal footing
with defendants, who are allowed under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 8 to include denials in their answers based on lack of information
in their initial investigation.' 4'
The proposals also point out that the rule provides for both mone-
tary and nonmonetary awards. The committee notes indicate that a
court has "significant discretion" in determining what sanctions
should be imposed "subject to the principle that the sanctions should
not be more severe than reasonably necessary to deter repetition of the
conduct by the offending person or comparable conduct by similarly
situated persons." 1 42 This appears to address the concern that mone-
tary sanctions are not always the most effective penalties. In addition,
the proposed amendments require monetary sanctions to be paid into
138. The proposals say:
By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating)
a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certi-
fying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after
an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances ....
FED. R. Crv. P. 11 (proposed amendments 1992) at 45 (emphasis added). See infra notes 149-56
for further discussion of this proposal. The 1991 preliminary draft contained the language "until
it is withdrawn." FED. R. Cv. P. 11 (proposed amendments 1991). The committee notes to the
1992 proposals make clear that the drafters intended to impose a continuing duty. The Rule
"emphasizes the duty of candor by subjecting litigants to potential sanctions for insisting upon a
position after it is no longer tenable . FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (proposed amendments 1992)
advisory committee's note at 51.
139. FED. R. Ov. P. 11 (proposed amendments 1992) at 46.
140. Id. advisory committee's note at 51.
141. Id. at 52. See also FED. R. Crv. P. 8(b) ("If a party is without knowledge or informa-
tion sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, the party shall so state and this
has the effect of a denial.").
142. FED. R. Ov. P. 11 (proposed amendments 1992) advisory committee's note at 53. The
committee notes point out that the purpose of Rule II sanctions "is to deter rather than to
compensate." Id.
1993]
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court as a penalty unless there are "unusual circumstances" such as
those in section (b)(1). 43 This provision could decrease the use of Rule
11 as simply a fee-shifting provision.
Further, the proposals require written notification of a Rule I I vio-
lation. The notice requirement would ease the potential sting by re-
quiring requests for sanctions to be made as a separate motion and by
giving alleged violators an opportunity to respond." It also would
provide a "safe harbor" by permitting someone to withdraw an un-
tenable pleading without fear of sanctions. 4 In addition, the drafters
rejected the United States Supreme Court's holding in Pavelic & Le-
Flore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, where the court said sanctions
applied only to the person who actually signed the paper. 46 The pro-
posed amendments broaden the scope of the rule and allow sanctions
against whoever is responsible for the violation, whether it be a firm,
a particular attorney, or a litigant. 47 The committee notes also indi-
cate an intent to curb Rule 11 motions by pointing out that the rule
"is not the exclusive source for control of improper presentations of
claims, defenses, or contentions."'48
C. Continuing Duty: A Bad Idea
The drafters may have undermined their attempt to soften the sting
of Rule 11 by imposing a continuing duty on someone who files a
paper in court. 49 The committee notes say:
"[A] litigant's obligations with respect to the contents of ... papers
are not measured solely as of the time they are filed with or
submitted to the court, but include reaffirming to the court and
143. Id. at 53-54.
144. FED. R. Crv. P. 11 (proposed amendments 1992) advisory committee's note at 50-51.
145. Id. at 57 ("[A] party will not be subject to sanctions on the basis of another party's
motion unless, after receiving the motion, it refuses to withdraw that position or to acknowledge
candidly that it does not currently have evidence to support a specified allegation."). Compare
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 397 (1990), where the United States Supreme
Court held that a voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a) would not eliminate a Rule II violation.
The "safe harbor" provision has drawn sharp criticism as "an endless exercise in aimless
retrospectivity." Samborn, supra note 8, at 28 (quoting John P. Frank, a lawyer who sponsored
an ad hoc Bench-Bar Proposal to Revise Civil Procedure Rule 11). However, the goal of Rule 11
is to keep frivolous papers out of court; the "safe harbor" will perform a valuable role in cut-
ting down on needless litigation.
146. 493 U.S. 120, 126 (1989).
147. FED. R. Civ. P. II (proposed amendments 1992) at 46-47.
148. Id. advisory committee's note at 58. The committee notes specifically mention that
courts can exercise their contempt powers or impose sanctions under other rules or under 28
U.S.C. § 1927. Id.; see also supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
149. FED. R. Civ. P. II (proposed amendments 1992) at 45.
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advocating positions contained in those pleadings and motions after
learning that they cease to have any merit."''5 0
Under the current version of Rule 11, courts have rejected the idea
that the 1983 amendments created a continuing duty.'5 '
The committee notes to the 1992 amendments indicate that this pro-
posal is intended to impose obligations on lawyers for failing to aban-
don or withdraw meritless positions.52 If approved, this proposal
would bring Rule 11 into line with 28 U.S.C § 1927, which imposes a
continuing duty.'53 However, a continuing duty may be "overly bur-
densome and . . . impossible to satisfy in many types of litigation."' 5 4
This broad proposal leaves open the possibility that a party may be
subject to numerous Rule 11 motions throughout the litigation or
could be punished simply because an opponent beats the lawyer to
finding new case law that makes a position untenable under Rule 11.
This standard might be reasonable if a lawyer worked on only one
case at a time, but lawyers typically have many ongoing cases. This
"continuing duty" standard penalizes a lawyer who puts aside a case
to work on other matters, but who had no intention of advancing an
unwarranted position. In short, the requirement may be almost im-
possible to meet because it is "exceedingly difficult to monitor contin-
ually ... every allegation asserted for the purpose of identifying
precisely when the allegation is no longer supportable and must be
withdrawn."' 5 Although the proposed amendments allow a lawyer to
withdraw an untenable position, 56 the requirement of a continuing
duty would undoubtedly generate Rule 11 motions that are time-con-
suming and contrary to the purpose of streamlining litigation.
VI. CoNcLusIoN
The thrust of the 1983 amendments-to impose a stricter standard
of conduct on lawyers or pro se litigants during the pretrial phases of
litigation' 7-should be preserved because other avenues do not deter
150. Id. advisory committee's note at 51.
151. See, e.g., Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1274 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub
nom. Suffolk County v. Graseck, 480 U.S. 918 (1987) ("Limiting the application of rule 11 to
testing the attorney's conduct at the time a paper is signed is virtually mandated by the plain
language of the rule.").
152. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (proposed amendments 1992) advisory committee's note at 51.
153. See Oliveri, 803 F.2d at 1274 ("a continuing prohibition against dilatory litigation is
imposed by § 1927") (citations omitted).
154. See Tobias, supra note 75, at 13.
155. Id. at 13-14.
156. FED. R. Ctv. P. 11 (proposed amendments 1992) at 47 advisory committee's note at 51.
157. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
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those who abuse the judicial process.""8 The drafters of the 1992 pro-
posed amendments said: "The revision broadens the scope of this ob-
ligation, but places greater constraints on the imposition of sanctions
and should reduce the number of motions for sanctions presented to
the court." 9 The notice provisions would allow a lawyer who may
have violated Rule 1 to withdraw the pleading without penalty when
the litigation has not consumed too much time. 160 The proposed
amendments also keep the focus on using Rule 11 as a way of discour-
aging abusive tactics.' 6' Regrettably, the fine-tuning done by these
amendments is likely to be negated by the continuing duty require-
ment. Placing a continuing duty on lawyers is too ambiguous and too
onerous. The standard is sure to generate more unwanted satellite liti-
gation as courts try to define the scope of this requirement. The draft-
ers of the proposed amendments aimed for a more effective and
workable Rule 11. Unfortunately, the imposition of a continuing duty
requirement-even with the "safe harbor" provisions-may leave
them short of their mark.
158. See supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
159. FED. R. Cirv. P. Il (proposed amendments 1992) advisory committee's note at 50.
160. The drafters used some common sense when they (apparently) realized there is little
harm done when a pleading is filed and withdrawn. See also discussion of this issue in Stevens'
dissent in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 409 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting),
discussed supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
161. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (proposed amendments 1992) at 46-49. See also William W. Schwar-
zer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HAtv. L. REv. 1013, 1020 (1988).
